헌 정 사
자료DB

No. 6227 Date: April 2, 1953

Office of Intelligence Research

THE PROBLEM OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The death or incapacity of President RHEE would almost certainly set off a heated struggle for power in the Republic of Korea (ROK).

The Vice President is unlikely to assume full political control of the government for other than a very short time. There would be two main bids for power. One would come from YI Pomsok, or possibly some other prominent leader of RHEE's present government-party political organization. Unless this move showed immediate strength and unity another would come from anti-RHEE forces led by the opposition in the National Assembly.

Whether the successor should be elected by the Assembly or by direct popular ballot would almost certainly be a major issue. The still unresolved issue of the relative position of the legislative and executive branches of government would also probably be reopened.

Although stability would be restored as soon as one leader secured control of the government, over the longrun stability probably would deteriorate. In any event, it is unlikely that the principal policies of the ROK Government would be basically altered.

Ⅰ.

PRESIDENT RHEE'S HEALTH AND SAFETY

Recent news reports indicate that President RHEE has recently recovered from another in a long series of minor ailments he has suffered during the past few years. Although there has been no marked deterioration in his health, the President is at least 78 years of age and his work schedule since assuming the presidency in 1948 would be trying even for a young man. He might at any time become temporarily or permanently incapacitated, or die. He also is in constant danger of assassination.

Ⅱ.

PRESIDENT RHEE'S ROLE IN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

President RHEE dominates ROK government and politics. In the government, he controls the executive branch of the central government, the provincial officials, and the national police, who exercise direct control over the small groups of families that are the basic unit in the society. In party politics, he controls the Liberal Party and its principal associated mass organizations, which collectively encompass the great majority of the adult population.

Under President RHEE's administration, little real power has existed outside this government-party organization. The Assembly has never been able to effectively check the executive branch, and the Assembly opposition forces lost general control to the faction supporting the President in mid-February 1953. The judiciary has always been ineffectual in the system of checks-and-balances, and local government has not yet achieved any appreciable degree of autonomy. Since the removal of Army Chief of Staff YI Ch'ongch'an in July 1952, President RHEE has had little to fear from the military forces, although his control over them is restricted by the integration of the regular ROK forces into the UN Command.

President RHEE has been careful to exercise personal control over the various elements of his organization. None of his associates has been permitted to become a deputy. Only in time of internal political conflict have they been permitted to exercise much authority over any important elements of the organization. At such times the President kept them balanced against one another and subsequently reduced the power of those who had gained any real stature. Factional intrigue within the government-party organization has been constant, and has increased markedly since July 1952.

It is the prestige and vigor of President RHEE, and his control over this large government and party organization, that has repeatedly cowed the opposition forces. Their apparent weakness, which has been marked since the President's victory in the internal political conflict of May-July 1952, is largely a reciprocal of his strength.

Ⅲ.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR SUCCESSION

The constitutional provisions for succession to the presidency are ambiguous or subject to controversy. Contention could arise in three areas:

(1) Although a new President would have to be elected in order to fill the vacancy legally, controversy already exists whether the election should be by the Assembly or by direct popular vote. Some supporters of President RHEE apparently contend that direct popular election has become mandatory as the result of amendment of Article 56 of the Constitution on July 4, 1952. However, the weight of evidence indicates that this Article was not amended and thus still provides for election by the Assembly. ^註01 Opposition leaders have contended in private, in any event, that the entire July 4 amendment action is invalid because of illegal procedure. ^註02

(2) Pending the election of the President, there might be controversy over who legally heads the executive. This question would be important, especially if the presidential election were delayed, because the interim successor would be in a position to influence the decision on procedures for election and even the outcome of the election. The Vice President presumably would succeed ad interim, under the provision in Article 52 that he shall act for the President if the President is unable to execute his duties. However, the present Vice President, HAM Taeyong, who will hold office until August 1956, is 83 years of age and poor health. Moreover, an eminent Korean constitutional authority has held that the Vice President would lose office on the death of the President because Article 55 states that their terms in office begin and end simultaneously. Although this is a strained interpretation, ^註03 it could be used as a rationalization to set the Vice President aside. The subsequent line of succession might then become the subject of controversy. Article 52 puts the Prime Minister next in line, but there has been no confirmed Prime Minister since October 1952.

(3) There is no provision for determining legal incapacity or, for that matter, when incapacity of the incumbent constitutes a vacancy in the presidency. This circumstance obviously affords opportunity for controversy.

IV.

IMMEDIATE GOVERNMENTAL AND POLITICAL REACTIONS

Death or incapacity of President RHEE would set off heated contention and intrigue for succession. The immediate outcome of the struggle would be as dependent upon trends subsequent to President RHEE's removal as upon the pattern of power at the time of his removal. The actions of the police and the military, the latter of course having the greater potential capabilities, probably will ultimately determine the outcome of the struggle.

Initially, the Vice President, at present HAM Taeyong, probably would take over -- nominally, at least -- the functions of the presidency. Apart from his legal claim, the main aspirants to the presidency probably would need time to muster their own support and gauge other reactions to the situation.

However, HAM Taeyong -- an elder statesman not involved in government and political activity -- would probably be unable to establish a strong caretaker administration under such circumstances. As contention developed the Vice President would be able to hold the prerogatives of the presidency only if he were supported by one of the major contending factions.

Although initially there might be a host of aspirants, one major contender for the presidency probably would come from within the President's government-party organization and another from the opposition forces.

A. Moves Within the Government and Government-Party Organization

Individual leaders in President RHEE's organization would endeavor to gain control first of that organization and then of the administration under the Vice President, and would hope to secure confirmation ultimately by a popular election. An attempt to depose the Vice President, if he were uncooperative, might be expected, as might the use of martial law. Fundamentally such a move would be accomplished through the national police but efforts would be made to use or neutralize the military forces.

President RHEE has deliberately balanced potential rivals against each other. Consequently, no single individual has been able to build up sufficient independent strength to enable him to emerge as a clear successor to RHEE. At present, YI Pomsok is the man most likely to make an effort to seize power and the man with greatest chances of success. Given his present degree of influence, YI should encounter little difficulty in pushing aside YI Hwal, CHANG T'aeksang, and other lesser politicians now being used as a balance against him by President RHEE. YANG Uchong and PAEK Tujin, however, should they choose to do so, are at present in a position to block him. YANG apparently holds the loyalty of the present police chief and, judging from reports of intrigue with former Army Chief of Staff CHONG Ilgwon, also appears to have stronger influence among high military officials than does YI Pomsok. YANG has recently been endeavoring to establish ties with Assembly members outside the pro-RHEE faction. Reports conflict as to whether he is aligned with or opposed to YI Pomsok. PAEK Tujin, the Acting Prime Minister, has never been active in party politics but has strong influence in the cabinet and might hold the balance of power to break a stalemate between YI and YANG.

B. Moves from the Opposition Forces

Unless the government-party apparatus showed immediate unity and strength, the opposition would almost certainly make a united bid for the succession. Even though the opposition is divided into the Democratic Nationalist Party, the (Assembly) Liberal Party, and other factions, they have generally stood together in unified opposition to President RHEE's supporters. The Assembly faction that supports President RHEE, which gained a slender majority in February 1953, has never been closely tied with the other pro-RHEE organizations and is particularly hostile to pro-RHEE leaders YI Pomsok and PAEK Tujin.

Opposition forces probably would move to have the Assembly elect a new President, and then attempt to muster support from key elements for him. They might try to make one of their own leaders President by Assembly vote. If necessary to regain control of the Assembly, and to gain broader support, the opposition forces might however name a compromise candidate. At the same time, they might attempt to vest real power in the hands of a Prime Minister responsible to the Assembly, thus reopening the still unsettled issue of legislative versus executive supremacy. In this move they would attempt to attract support from elements of the government-party apparatus and particularly to secure the support, and possibly intervention, of the adherents of former Army Chief of Staff YI Ch'ongch'an and, possibly, of the present Chief of Staff. In these moves they would take a moral position based on the constitutional prerogatives of the Assembly. If hard pressed they probably would invite intervention by US or UN agencies to support the Assembly election of a new President.

Several possible combinations of President and Prime Minister might be put forward by the opposition. An obvious move would be to elect the Vice President to be the successor in the hope of rallying support from large elements of the administration. Like use could be made of former Vice President YI Siyong or the elderly YI Kapsong, who have much prestige. Opposition leaders CHANG Myon or SIN Ikhi might be put up for Prime Minister or possibly for the presidency itself. Other possibilities for Prime Minister would be opposition leader CHO Pyongok or, as a compromise possibility if the presidency had been assured, CHANG T'aeksang or YANG Uchong.

V.

PROBABLE RESULTS OF A POPULAR ELECTION

The results of a popular election of a new President would be influenced primarily by the individual leader or faction exercising general control of the government during the election. Nation-wide slates have been used only in the election of the President and Vice President in August 1952. In the Assembly elections of 1948 and 1950 and the local elections of the spring of 1952, the people voted on local candidates. The electorate could be expected to be impressed by the names of elder statesmen and candidates who ran in the 1952 presidential election -- YI Pomsok, YI Siyong, HAM Taeyong, and CHO Pongam. Opinions of the electorate on these and other candidates would be shaped by the Liberal Party, the Youth Corps, and particularly the police.

Ⅵ.

LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS

Once a successor to President RHEE had established control the immediate internal crisis would be past. There would be little danger of an uprising. The surface stability of the regime would soon be about equal to that of President RHEE's administration.

However, the character of the regime would be changed profoundly, the extent and nature of the changes depending to a large extent upon the individual who succeeds President RHEE. In any case, the new administration probably would seek to carry out a thorough repression of the opposing leaders. Nevertheless none of the aspirants presently in the field can be expected, as President, to attain President RHEE's position of domination, although some might improve on the efficiency of the administration. The regime would be somewhat more vulnerable to censure and disaffection than President RHEE has been. The new regime would be forced to start on a narrower body of support than President RHEE has had, and probably could not equal RHEE's strength for some years to come. A forceful successor such as YI Pomsok or CHO Pyongok might establish himself relatively firmly over a period of time. Under a less forceful successor such as CHANG Myon or SIN Ikhi, however, the stability of government would tend to deteriorate sharply.

If a parliamentary system of government were established, even within the limitations set forth in the July 4, 1952 constitutional amendment, instability and internal conflict in government would increase. Limitations on ability to vote a cabinet out of office after it had been confirmed might prevent frequent changes in cabinet, but conflict between executive and legislative branches would mount and critical hitches might develop out of inability to establish a cabinet.

There would be little change in the basic objectives of the administration -- unification of Korea, continuation of the fight against Communism, obtaining economic and military assistance and assurances from the US, and security against and equality with Japan. Depending on the individual successor to President RHEE, ROK-US conflict on these issues might be reduced.